![]() |
PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS, PEACE AND DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA 111 Northwood Road, Thornton Heath,
Surrey CR7 8HW, UK |
|||||||||||||
|
The use of British military equipment in Aceh: the case for a military embargo against Indonesia See also statement calling for an international military embargo against Indonesia, 23 June 2003 2 July 2003 Chronology 8 May 2003 19 May A military spokesman says the Hawks '…could well be used [in a direct attack role] if we wanted to' [The Guardian, 20 May]. 21 May 25 May Free Aceh Movement (GAM) reports Hawks are used to attack villages near Lhokseumawe, North Aceh. The army's chief spokesman, General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, says there is no problem with the use of the Hawks: 'For us, we have already paid so there is no problem. We use fighters to defend our sovereignty…' [The Times, 26 May] 28 May 1 June 3/4 June O'Brien says: 'I hope that we will not have to take a view that our relationships with the armed forces would be affected if this agreement is broken', but he also warns that future spare parts deals could be affected [AFP, 4 June]. 5 June 12 June Before August 2002, the Indonesian government provided assurances that British-supplied military equipment would not be used in Aceh or be used anywhere in Indonesia against civilians to prevent the exercise of their rights of free expression, assembly and association or other international human rights standards. The Indonesian government added that if, against expectations, they were to contemplate the use of such equipment in Aceh at a later stage they would inform the British government in advance. 'In August 2002 the British government received advance notification from the Indonesian government that they may deploy British-built military equipment to Aceh for casualty removal and logistics. Hawk jets do not perform these tasks. Ministers agreed in September 2002 to fresh assurances that British-built equipment would not be used to violate human rights anywhere in Indonesia nor would the equipment be used offensively. The assurances apply to all British-supplied military equipment. I emphasised the continuing importance we attach to the assurances during my recent visit to Indonesia. 'I visited Indonesia on 3 - 4 June 2003, and raised the issue of British-supplied military equipment with President Megawati and senior members of the Indonesian government. I reminded them of the assurances about the use of British-supplied military equipment in Aceh, and warned of the possible consequences for defence sales and defence relationships if there was a breach of the assurances. I also stressed that Indonesian military action in Aceh should be proportionate and in accordance with international standards on human rights. 'The Indonesian government confirmed that British-supplied Hawk aircraft were used in Aceh on 19 May but claimed that they were not used in violation of the assurances. We will be using all available sources of information to monitor the use of British-supplied equipment and will follow up all credible allegations on the misuse of British-supplied equipment.' 16 June 17 June 23 June 23 June I July The case for an embargo When challenged on its policy on arms sales to Indonesia, the British Government has over time variously stated - in replies to parliamentary questions and in letters from Ministers etc. - that Indonesia has given 'assurances' that British military equipment will not be used for 'for internal repression', 'in counter-insurgency operations', 'offensively' or 'to suppress human rights' anywhere in Indonesia.
The very deployment of the Hawks and Scorpions to Aceh is without question a breach of these 'assurances'. The equipment is playing a key role in a major military offensive; it is not in Aceh for harmless display purposes. TAPOL and others have long maintained that Indonesia's 'assurances' are worthless given its record of repeatedly using imported equipment in East Timor, Aceh and West Papua and against its own citizens. It is clear from the statements quoted above that military chiefs do not intend to comply with any restrictions on the use of the equipment and that they regard the 'assurances' as either non-existent or non-binding. This makes the British Government's continued reliance on them untenable. The Government's assertion that it will monitor the use of the equipment and follow up credible allegations of misuse smacks of complacency or, worse, a desperate desire to do nothing which will upset the lucrative arms trade with Indonesia. The huge increase in the value of exports in 2002, noted above, suggests that the latter is the primary motivating factor. By indicating that it will only take action after the equipment has been misused, the Government is effectively saying that it will wait until the equipment is used to perpetrate human rights violations (most likely the killing of civilians) before it will do anything more. The implication that the onus is on people on the ground to produce 'credible' evidence of the misuse of equipment is an appalling abdication of responsibility by the British Government. We firmly believe it is intolerable for the Government to engage with the TNI on a business-as-usual basis and we are urging it to:
|
|