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West Papua: The Flawed Integration into Indonesia

26 October 2006

Paper presented to -
Refugee Studies Centre
St Antony’s College, Oxford University
Dynamics of Conflict and Displacement in West Papua, Indonesia
Dahrendorf Room, St Antony’s College

The resignation of Suharto in May 1998 opened the way for a series of important political demands. It became possible to hold an act of self-determination in East Timor which ultimately led to its political independence. The Acehnese demanded a referendum which paved the way for a peace process that concluded successfully in August 2005. All the signs are that a sustainable and lasting peace will prevail in Aceh. On 11 December 2006, local elections will be held with the participation of independent candidates. It could be argued that West Papua remains the last major conflict in the Indonesian archipelago yet to be resolved.

In West Papua, the fall of Suharto was also greeted with a feeling of optimism and a demand for political self-determination. Nine months later, a delegation of civil society representatives, known as the Team of 100, a cross-section of intellectuals, students, ex-political prisoners, Muslim leaders, women’s organisations and members of the local assembly, met President B.J. Habibie to discuss development issues. This historic meeting took place on 26 February 1999 and a single political demand was put forward: the Papuans want independence from Indonesia. Predictably, Habibie was taken aback and said nothing. He asked the Team of 100 to reconsider their demand.

The next President, Abdurrachman Wahid, popularly known as Gus Dur, was better prepared to accommodate some of the political demands of the Papuans. From 23-26 February the National Consultation of Papuans took place (Musyawarah Besar Papua, Mubes Papua) when three main issues were addressed: Pelurusan Sejarah or the need to rectify history, the development of a coordinated political approach and the need to consolidate the upsurge of the developing movement.

Gus Dur tried to win the hearts and minds of the Papuans by promising far-reaching autonomy for West Papua (and Aceh), he spend New Year’s Eve of 2000 in Jayapura, the capital and decided to rename the territory then known as Irian Jaya as Papua and agreed to finance the Second Papuan People’s Congress. But things soon went sour as both the armed forces and important sections of the Indonesian establishment strongly disagreed with his accommodating policies towards dissent in Aceh and West Papua. Gus Dur lacked the necessary statesmanlike skills and his policies were increasingly sabotaged. By mid-2000 all of his policies and good intentions had collapsed and military operations were resumed in West Papua and Aceh. In June 2001 Gus Dur was impeached and replaced by Megawati. This brought an end to the brief Papuan Spring. A few months later, Theys Eluay, the PDP chair, was strangled and died and 5 other leaders were imprisoned.

A few lessons can be learned from this brief Papuan Spring. Firstly, Papuans were increasingly ready to engage in peaceful dialogue with Jakarta. The emergence of organisations like Presidium Dewan Papua and Dewan Adat Papua and the declaration of ‘Papua, Land of Peace’ became the expression of this new, coordinated political approach. The second lesson from the 1998-2000 period is that for the first time, Papuan nationalism was being taken seriously by the Jakarta authorities.

During the New Order period under Suharto, the sole doctrine applied to West Papua was the militaristic security approach, treating any dissent or form of Papuan nationalism as subversive. There was a clash between Indonesian nationalism and Papuan nationalism. In the Sukarno period (1949-1966) Indonesian nationalism had flourished and in the early sixties, during for re-incorporation of West Irian, it became second nature for Indonesians to accept the paradigm: 'Without Irian, Indonesia is not complete.'

I remember vividly when President Sukarno, in a historic speech in December 1961, proclaimed Trikora (Tri Komando Rakyat) for the liberation of West Irian. A few weeks later , the Mandala Command to liberate West Irian was set up with Major General Suharto as its commander. On a personal note, I belong to the first generation of post-independence Indonesians who enjoyed or endured intense ideological input on nation and character building. As a high school student it was an act of patriotism to become a volunteer for the struggle to liberate West Irian. My schoolmates and I had to sacrifice many weekends to have basic military training.

It was only years later, after I migrated to Europe, that I began to realise that something called Papuan nationalism was alive and well. I also began to understand the injustice that had been done to the Papuans with the Act of Free Choice in 1969. To this very day, a substantial part of Papuans regard this plebiscite as fundamentally flawed. Demands to re-examine the Act of Free Choice or rewrite Indonesian history regarding this event remain a legitimate and minimum political demand, not only for Papuans but also for Indonesians to understand their own history and the mistakes made by earlier generations.

There have been several waves of nationalism in Papua. The first wave was from 1944 to 1962 when West Papua was under a different administration and developed a political culture quite distinct from that in Indonesia. The second wave evolved under the authoritarian rule of Suharto and the resistance movement OPM, with its armed wing, became the main spokespeople against the heavy-handed oppression of the Papuans. It could be argued that the security approach adopted by the military was responsible for triggering a strong anti-Indonesian sentiment.

The wave of Papuan nationalism during the post Suharto era is in a way a mixture of all these elements. Pockets of OPM groups still exist, a strong anti-Indonesia persists while new, peace-loving groupings have learnt from the experiences in East Timor and the peace process in Aceh.

Over the years, marginalisation of the Papuans also triggered anti-Indonesia feelings. Papuan leaders often point to four basic problems. Firstly, the yawning gap between West Papua and Jakarta. All important decisions are made in Jakarta and, despite their abundant natural resources - oil, gas, copper, gold, marine and forest resources - West Papuans remain poor. Secondly, the traditional rights of Papuans have long been neglected and the massive influx of newcomers has only exacerbated this problem. Thirdly, the gross violation of human rights that have occurred since 1963 have not been addressed. The fourth problem was mentioned earlier: the flawed Act of Free Choice of 1969.

So far the central government had displayed its good intentions by introducing a Special Autonomy Law adopted by Parliament in October 2001. This law was supposed to deal with all the above problems but five years later, most problems remain. Initially many Papuan intellectuals enthusiastically helped to draft the law only to become disillusioned afterwards. Other issues were prioritized such as the division of Papua into three provinces. During the Megawati presidency, the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law was never prioritized and important issues such as the establishment of the MRP (Papuan People’s Council) were neglected. The MRP eventually came into being after long delays, under the present SBY government. The Special Autonomy Law has many weaknesses not least the lack of capacity of the local government, and the overwhelming persistence of corruption. It would appear that the Special Autonomy Law should either be drastically overhauled or altogether buried.

The results of the Aceh Peace Process following Law no11/2006 on Aceh governance, could be seen as setting a precedent. This law was the result of eight months of peace talks in Helsinki between GAM, the Free Aceh Movement, and the Indonesian Government where all aspects of civil, political, social, cultural and economic rights were negotiated. It was another seven months before it was adopted by the national parliament in Jakarta. Something similar should be created to accommodate the basic problems of the Papuans. Dialogue between Papuans and decision -makers in Jakarta, should be held at different levels on an informal or formal level.

Sensitive issues like the 1969 Act of Free Choice should not and cannot be avoided. Institutions like LIPI, the Indonesian National Academy of Sciences, have the difficult task of dealing with these issues.

I would l like to end on a positive note. A few years ago, this Refugees Studies Centre organized a seminar on Aceh. It was a period when everything looked bleak, the peace process had collapsed and it seemed that there was no light at the end of the tunnel. As we all know, the Aceh Peace process is arguably the most solid peace process in the world. Violence has ceased, the economy is booming and political freedoms have flourished. The present rulers in Jakarta have shown enough political will to find a solution to the war in Aceh. We should encourage them and provide them with ideas to do a similar thing for West Papua.

Liem Soei Liong
London, October 2006

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