![]() |
PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS, PEACE AND DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA 111 Northwood Road, Thornton Heath,
Surrey CR7 8HW, UK |
||||||||
|
Contents list
Intelligence agency implicated in Munir's murder As the first phase of investigations into the murder of Indonesia's foremost human rights activist, Munir, draws to a close, more evidence has emerged linking the country's intelligence agency, BIN, to the murder. The focus of attention is a high-ranking, retired army officer who was head of the agency at the time of the murder. Information has also come to light that the conspirators had considered several ways of killing Munir. So far only one person has been arrested. The conspiracy that led to the murder of Munir last September has continued to provoke widespread condemnation across the world while in Indonesia, on-going investigations have been extensively reported in the media. The Fact-Finding Team set up by presidential decision to conduct investigations ended its six-month mandate on 23 June. It has produced a 100-page report which has been presented to President. Members of the Team said that the report would not be made public. RLA Laureates mourn Munir's death In a statement to the Laureates, Suciwati said:
'This is not just a question of justice for Munir and his family but is also vital for the protection of the whole human rights community in Indonesia,' the letter said. When Laureates, Angie Zelter of the UK and Carmel Budiardjo of the UK and Indonesia, contacted the Indonesian embassy in Vienna with a request for an appointment to deliver the letter, embassy officials made it clear that it would not be possible to arrange a meeting. High-level obstructions When members of the Team met President Yudhoyono on 24 June to deliver their report, the President told them that he was committed to bringing the perpetrators of the crime to justice. After meeting the President, Team member, Usman Hamid said the Team had recommended that the President put pressure on the Police and BIN to co-operate with the investigations. 'We do not doubt the President but it remains a question whether government institutions (under the President) support his efforts,' said Usman. The investigations ran smoothly until the final stage when the Team issued a summons to retired army officer, Lt General Hendropriyono who was head of BIN at the time of the murder. Under Megawati Sukarnoputri, who was President of Indonesia at the time, Hendropriyono as head of BIN was accorded the unusual privilege of being a member of her cabinet. However, Hendropriyono took strong exception to the Team and refused to comply with its request to appear for questioning. He accused the team of 'arrogance' and 'character assassination'; he alleged that they had acted impolitely to a person of his position. He also filed a complaint to the police about two members of the Team. His lawyer, Syamsu Djalal, did not mince words in his contempt for the investigations. He said: 'Who is this Munir anyway that a presidential regulation had to be issued? A lot of people die but no regulations are made for them.' Suspect arrested It is understood that Pollycarpus will be charged with being an accomplice to murder, and of forgery and conspiracy. The other two suspects who are not under arrest are both flight attendants who served Munir with food or drink. Munir died on 7 September last year on board Garuda flight 974 from Jakarta to Amsterdam. An autopsy conducted by Dutch forensic experts after his arrival in the Netherlands found that he had been poisoned with a lethal dose of arsenic. The poison was added to a drink that he was served on the first leg of the flight from Jakarta to Singapore. Soon after leaving Singapore, Munir was stricken with severe vomiting and diarrhoea. A doctor in board who was a passenger gave him something to calm him, not realising the gravity of his condition. Shortly before the plane wad due to land, a stewardess approached him on a seat near the toilet, only to discover that he was dead. Communications with BIN The Team had examined the cell phone of Pollycarpus and had traced several dialled numbers, one of which was a confidential line inside the office of retired Major-General Muchdi Purwoprajoyo, who was BIN deputy director for agent moblisation. Records showed that as many as 26 calls had been made to Muchdi, before and after Munir's death and that multiple calls had been placed to Pollycarpus from Muchdi's personal mobile number. Muchdi was formerly a head of Kopassus, the army's special forces. He recently resigned from BIN, and declined two requests from the Fact-Finding Team to appear for questioning. He has denied that he had made calls to Pollycarpus and said alleged that his phone may have been used by someone else. The Team also gained access to an internal security agency document which listed several plots to murder Munir, including the use of sorcery. The mid-air method was one of the listed plots. According to Marsudhi Hanafi, the document assigned specific teams for each of the plots. Another former army officer who the Team wanted to question is Colonel Bambang Irawan, a retired special forces officer who has been identified by a witness as having been on the aircraft, although his name did not appear on the passenger list. According to Hanafi, Irawan has been identified as a BIN operative. Now up to the police There was no question of its trying to prolong its mandate which would probably not have been possible anyway. The Team appears to have taken its investigations as far as they could go and has asked the President to set up an oversight group to monitor the conduct of the police, in whose hands the case now rests. Impunity must not prevail When announcing the establishment of the Fact-Finding Team, President Yudhoyono described this as a 'test case' for Indonesia. If the guilty men are brought to justice, this will certainly enhance his reputation and be an important sign that in Indonesia today, the rule of law is not empty rhetoric. Conflict flares again in Central Sulawesi Two bombing outrages in May that resulted in the deaths of more than twenty people with more than twice that number injured have drawn renewed attention to the simmering conflict that has dogged Central Sulawesi for the past six years. The outrages occurred in a busy market place in the town of Tentena in the district of Poso, Central Sulawesi on 28 May. The first bomb exploded shortly after eight in the morning as crowds of people were arriving to do their shopping in the popular, traditional market. People in the vicinity rushed to the scene of the explosion, either to assist the people who had been hit or just to see what had happened. However, fifteen minutes later, there was another explosion a short distance away, causing yet more casualties. Altogether twenty-two people died at the scene or later in hospital. The death toll was expected to rise as some of the injured had sustained very serious injuries. There has recently been a big influx of Christians into Tentena seeking refuge from the town of Poso some 50 kilometres away. The inhabitants were panic-stricken by the latest explosions and started setting up guard posts along the roads leading into the town. This was the latest and by far the most deadly in a series of blasts which have occurred in Poso since the beginning of 2004. Two bombings occurred during 2004, one of which, also in a market place, resulted in six deaths. Besides the two bombings, there were several murders with the use of firearms or sharp implements. The perpetrators are described as being highly proficient, never missing their target. But they have come to be known as 'mysterious shootings' because none of the perpetrators have been apprehended. But in April 2005 more bombings occurred, followed by two in May, the second of which caused the largest number of casualties. The two bombing incidents in April which caused no casualties were targeted at the Office of Peace and Reconciliation and the office of the Institution for Strengthening Civil Society. The choice of targets strongly suggests that the criminals are hoping to undermine efforts being made to restore good relations between the Muslim and Christian communities in Poso. Divided community The conflict in Poso which first flared up in 1998 resulted in prolonged clashes between the two communities, resulting in more than one thousand deaths, and the displacement of around 100,000 people. In December 2001, the two communities reached an accord called the Malino Declaration, which was brokered by Jusuf Kalla, now the country's vice-president. However, the accord led only to a short reprieve and according to local observers, there were no fewer than 129 recorded violations from the time of the Declaration up to December 2004. The Declaration made provision for periodic 'security restoration operations'
while the security forces kept warning towards the end of each operation
that security would deteriorate, as justification for more troops to be
deployed. Commenting on the May bombings, Vice-President Kalla said the incidents had all the hallmarks of terrorist actions by Dr Azahari, a Malaysian fundamentalist leader who, along with Nurdin M. Top, is suspected of being behind several bombing outrages including the one in Bali in October 2002 which resulted in more than 200 deaths. Kalla said he was convinced that the Poso bombings were not the result of the conflict between the two communities, who were in the process of creating a humanitarian alliance to serve all the people in the district. Some observers have suggested that the explosions were intended to distract attention from a local corruption case or to destabilise local elections due to be held in June. The more likely explanation however is that those responsible were intent upon using acts of terrorism to create the impression that the government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is not in control, and where better to do this than in a region that has a history of communal discord? According to General Da'i Bachtiar, Indonesia's chief of police, recent intelligence suggests that groups connected with Azahari have drawn up plans to carry out a series of bombing outrages in the near future. [Tempo, 5 June 2005] While the police have detained fourteen people believed to have been involved in the latest bombings, the government has been criticised for failing to take action to bring the situation in Central Sulawesi under control. Some facts about Sulawesi
Suharto must be brought to justice They call him the 'luckiest ex-dictator' in the world, the one who got away and who will live the rest of his days in the comfort of his family home, surrounded by their ill-gotten gains. This is the man whose hands are stained with the blood of millions, in Indonesia and East Timor, who wrought such repression in Aceh and West Papua. Yet, the present Indonesian government saw fit to exonerate him and senior politicians flocked to his bedside to pay homage when he fell ill in May. This is impunity with a vengeance. News of the government's announcement to grant Suharto amnesty sent shock waves through the human rights community in Indonesia. This is the man whose New Order held Indonesia in its grip for 33 years, who sent his armed forces out to murder people and strike fear throughout the country. As one commentator said scornfully: 'These people say we should forget everything. But we are talking about what Suharto did to the Republic. It never occurred to them because they are Suharto's men.' During the invasion of East Timor in December 1975, carried out on Suharto's orders, and the 24-year occupation, a third of the population lost their lives. This puts Suharto firmly in the ranks of a war criminal. Tens of thousands were imprisoned and whole communities were forced to leave their homes and resettle in strategic hamlets, under army surveillance. TAPOL calls for justice It is now seven years since General Suharto was forced to resign on 21 May 1998, following a wave of student demonstrations across the country, bringing to an end the bloodiest era in Indonesia's modern history. Suharto seized power from President Sukarno in 1965 as up to a million people were slaughtered by forces acting under Suharto's orders, in what has been acknowledged as one of the worst massacres of the twentieth century. The wave of killings engulfed Communists or alleged Communists as whole families were annihilated. The Communist Party and numerous organisations alleged to be affiliated to it were banned for allegedly plotting a coup against the President. To consolidate his power over the state, Parliament and the Consultative Assembly were purged and coerced into adopting a decree banning the teaching of Marxism-Leninism. This decree still remains in force. Following the white terror against the left-wing, other parties were forced to merge and pledge allegiance to the regime. While general elections were held every five years, the outcome was a foregone conclusion and Suharto's tight grip on the state apparatus was never challenged. Two student movements were crushed in the 1970s and in 1984, hundreds of Muslims were killed in the harbour region of Tanjung Priok, following protests about the arrest of four custodians of a local mosque. The Army was also used to conduct a reign of terror in Aceh and West Papua where sentiments against rule from Jakarta have long been very strong. Under Suharto's command, hundreds of thousands of people were detained and held without charge or trial. Thousands were exiled to the island of Buru where many hundreds died of starvation or as a result of atrocities perpetrated by the troops in command of the prison island. Since their release, these ex-prisoners have suffered continued discrimination, and are today still living with the stigma of alleged involvement in an event known as the G-30-S which occurred on 1 October 1965, about which they knew nothing. (See separate article.) Discrimination widespread As one former political prisoner, Sobron Aidit, who spent years on Buru, said in Jakarta: 'I won't forgive Suharto. Millions died because of him. His sword is still bloody.' Suharto was also responsible for the invasion and occupation of East Timor in 1975. During the course of the occupation, one third of the population died. The Indonesian army ruled the country with merciless disregard for the people and tens of thousands were driven from their homes and villages and held for years in prison. Corruption charges trivialise enormity of his
crimes It is high time for the man who committed so many crimes against humanity to be brought to trial to account for his deeds. It is an insult to the millions of Indonesians and East Timorese who have suffered as a result of the crimes perpetrated during the Suharto era to allow this man to live out the rest of his life in pace and tranquillity while his victims still continue to suffer. Parrot-like praise for Suharto The bird died a few years ago but it should be pleased with itself for the example it set, as all his boss's four successors, Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono have dutifully followed the parrot's example. All have been very reluctant to force him into court to face corruption and human rights abuse allegations. All of them apparently believed that Suharto would never recover from his sickness which was used by the courts as a reason not to start his trial. It is as if all the presidents after Suharto did not want to believe that maybe some day he might get better, thus dispensing with periodical medical check-ups to ascertain whether he was still sick. The writer, Jakarta Post columnist Kornelius Purba, said that Suharto, just out of hospital, will turn 84 next month, so 'dare we disturb his peaceful life? After more than seven years, more and more people are lining up to say nice things about him.' He concludes that 'it is merely false hope to expect the current government to bring this man to justice. Even students have now lost their appetite for protesting against him, meaning that Suharto can now continue to live out his peaceful existence. So just what are we supposed to do with this old man?' [The Jakarta Post, 13 May 2005] New Order enjoyed US support He had nothing but contempt for claims that Suharto created a united Indonesia. 'While the military claim they helped unite the country, 'the facts show that ….. it has been the military that has been breaking the nation apart. … The military shot and killed people who tried to fight for themselves, kidnapped them, made them disappear… in the process becoming the root of the disintegration of the nation.'. Pouring scorn on claims that Suharto's New Order brought development, he said the development projects 'belonged to Suharto and his cronies'. Unfit to stand trial? But many among Indonesia's elite have softened their views about Suharto. Ali Sadikin, a former governor of Jakarta and fierce critic of the dictator, was one of those to visit Suharto in hospital. He said Suharto should be tried to uphold justice but then immediately forgiven. One of the country's leading commentators, sociologist Frans Mangis-Suseno, said investigations against him should not stop although the results should take into account his achievements when ruling the country for 32 years. A Muslim scholar, Komaruddin Hidayat argued that if the government wanted to offer amnesty, it should involve the public in making such a decision. But he claimed that negative sentiment against Suharto was apparently decreasing while humanitarian emotions were 'taking sides' with the ailing former president. [Jakarta Post, 12 May 2005] The world's luckiest ex-dictator 'Is it surprising then,' he writes, 'that Benedict R.O.G Anderson, a well known Indonesianist, not long after Suharto resigned, wondered why it is that Indonesians, after three decades of the authoritarian and repressive New Order still pay homage to their ex-dictator. As Anderson perhaps suggests, many Indonesians not only admire but are actually awestruck in dealing with the phenomenon of power like Suharto's. 'This love-hate ambiguity concerning Suharto and his power is stunning
and its consequences are perhaps most dramatically expressed and graphically
illustrated when he, at the hospital, was visited by his friends and (ex)
foes.' No doubt Suharto is laughing up his sleeve and congratulating himself for conveniently falling ill and opening a floodgate of sympathy from the cream of the country's political elite who felt the urge to flock to his bedside. Along with exoneration from the government and homage from so many politicians, Indonesia's ruthless ex-dictator can feel confident that things are going his way. Former political prisoners demand justice There are today in Indonesia literally hundreds of thousands of people who, with their relatives and offspring, continue to be stigmatised because they were detained and held in prison for ten or more years without charge or trial, following the events of October 1965 which brought Suharto to power. Although charges were never brought, they are subject to a range of discriminatory practices, affecting their lives and the lives of their families. Since 2003, many groups of former political prisoners have made representations to the country's National Human Rights Commission and to the DPR, the national parliament, seeking rehabilitation and compensation for their unlawful arrest and detention. Following an event on 1 October 1965 when six generals and an officer were kidnapped and killed, the Indonesian army launched mass arrests which continued into the early months of 1966. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of people were slaughtered right across the country, in a massacre that has been named the worst massacre in the twentieth century. With the exception of a few hundred men and women who were brought to
trial and either executed or given very long sentences, the rest became
known as 'tapols' (for tahanan politik, or political prisoners). They
were said to have been 'either directly or indirectly involved in the
G-30-S,' (Gerakan 30 September or 30 September Movement, which is how
the event on 1 October came to be known). The letters 'PKI' were added,
implying that the Indonesian Communist Party was responsible for the 1
October incident. Not a shred of evidence has ever been produced to back
such a claim. This was nothing less than a ploy to legitimise the crackdown
and annihilation of the PKI and all alleged associated groups. Many jobs are still closed to them in sectors where they might 'have an influence' on other people. These include performing as shadow-play puppet-masters, journalists and priests. Their sons and daughters find their paths to education and training courses blocked, once it is discovered that either of their parents was once a 1965 tapol. In many regions, their identity cards still bear the initials 'ET' for ex-tapol. Under Indonesian law, all persons over the age of 60 years are issued with identity cards for life, but this is not applicable for ex-tapols, who are required to seek renewal every five years. Artist challenges the law When she applied for an ID in January 2003 she was issued with a card for five years, although, being over sixty years old, she was entitled to one for life. However, this was denied her on the basis of an Interior Affairs Ministerial Instruction, Inmendagri No 24 1991 which denies former detainees this right. Although in July 2003 a court ordered the Koja Sub-District head to give her an ID card for life, the local government is still refusing her request. The chief judge hearing her case said their refusal was in violation of legislation protecting human rights and also represented an abuse of power. He also said that a decision in her favour could set a legal precedent for the rehabilitation of political detainees, as long as the decision was final. The case is currently under appeal. Rehabilitation, a Presidential prerogative She received a dossier of letters sent to the then President, Megawati Sukarnoputri, by the Chief Justice on behalf of the Supreme Court, the chair of the National Human Rights Commission, and the Speaker of Parliament. They called upon her to bring this matter to a satisfactory conclusion by making a declaration of rehabilitation. In his letter to President Megawati dated 12 June 2003, the Supreme Justice, Bagir Manan, states: '… the power to grant rehabilitation rests not with the Supreme Court but is the prerogative of the President. However, these efforts have come to nought. Having failed to achieve anything to rectify what is such a legitimate grievance, the '1965 victims' as they now see themselves, decided upon a different course of action. Class action 'We have filed this Action because our clients have, ever since 1965, been victims of allegations or stigmatisation as members of the PKI and they have been deprived of any recognition, protection or respect of their rights as citizens. Their right to employment, to ownership of personal possessions, to education and their cultural rights have been violated,' he said. The Class Action is being filed against former Presidents Suharto, J.B. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri and the current President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. All these rights are guaranteed under the Indonesian Constitution and under Law No 39/1999 on Basic Human Rights as well as under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Class Action is being filed because a number of the discriminatory laws and regulations enacted and implemented by Indonesian governments since the time of Suharto remain in force. [The Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI, was formally banned in March 1966 though its members and sympathisers had been the victims of massacres and mass arrests since October 1965 when Suharto took power from Indonesia's first president, Sukarno.] Sihombing said that LBH Jakarta has been authorised by seven organisations representing victims of PKI stigmatisation to take this Class Action. One organisation represents members who were compelled to give up their jobs or were dismissed without receiving salaries, allowances or severance pay, another whose members were dismissed from state employment, the armed forces or the police without receiving pensions to which they were entitled; another whose members who had been subject to special investigation for not having 'a clean environment' and were therefore unable to find work. Another represents veterans entitled to allowances which have been denied them, while another is composed of people whose land or property has been seized. Another organisation represents persons whose artistic creativity had been obstructed. Sihombing said that an estimated twenty million people were victims of PKI stigmatisation including three million members or leaders of the PKI who were murdered, and seventeen million who were PKI sympathisers or admirers of President Sukarno, plus their children and grandchildren. Ecosoc discrimination The Action also calls on the defendants to erect monuments to the victims
of the 1965 massacre and calls on President Yudhoyono to include the history
of the persecution in the national curriculum. In Lubang Buaya, which
is where the bodies of the murdered general were taken, a monument depicting
the October 1965 incident is still standing. It contains gruesome sculptured
images of women - members of Gerwani which was banned by Suharto along
with the PKI - defiling the bodies of the generals, despite the fact that
such allegations were proven to be utterly false many years ago. Court hearings proceed slowly If one considers the culpability of the five presidents, then Suharto is clearly the worst offender, since all the discriminatory regulations were adopted during the 33 years of his dictatorship. The four succeeding presidents are held responsible for failing to lift these laws and regulations. Abdurrahman Wahid, known popularly as Gus Dur, who took power in 2001 following J.B. Habibie, was the only President to publicly apologise to the victims for the massacres as many of the perpetrators were from his own organisation, the Nahdlatul Ulama. He also sought to have Law XXV/1966 banning the teachings of Marxism-Leninism repealed but provoked a heap of abuse and anger for doing so. In discussions with many of the victims, Carmel was told that Gus Dur has expressed agreement with the action and has also stated his willingness to appear as a witness on behalf of the plaintiffs. It remains to be seen whether President Yudhoyono has the political will to act on this pressing human rights problem. By issuing a rehabilitation decree, he would mitigate the burden of millions of fellow citizens, many of whom are in the declining years of their lives. The anti-Communist fervour that swept across Indonesia in the wake of Suharto's seizure of power from Sukarno has surely lost its grip. Or is this a gamble that Yudhoyono is not prepared to take, for fear of unleashing another wave of protest, such as the one which was provoked by Gus Dur's efforts to heal this wounds in Indonesian society? SBY government: the first six months Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, better known as SBY, is the first directly elected president of Indonesia and took office in late October 2004. Although a relative newcomer to politics, he won the two-round elections resoundingly, standing against President Megawati who performed woefully during her three-year term. Indonesian voters gave SBY a sizeable majority and want him to deal firmly with corruption and reverse the stalemate that has bedevilled reformasi. Indonesia is often described as a messy state with poor economic performance,
a lack of good governance, widespread corruption and absence of the rule
of law. Three changes at the top since 1998 also suggests that the new
government can expect to face huge difficulties in reversing the reputation
of the Suharto government. Election year 2004 While new governments are usually judged after the first hundred days, the tsunami in December struck with devastating results, and the SBY government had to act to handle the disaster, so it would be unfair to judge the government's performance up to the end of December. Under the circumstances, Indonesia watchers delayed their appraisals till SBY had been in power for six months, to see whether he has lived up to his promises. It could be argued that in a country with so many social, political and economic problems, nobody can ever be successful. SBY's presidency will certainly face an uphill struggle and it is with this in mind that we attempt to make a judgement. Anti-corruption drive This went down well with the electorate and he will be judged on how he has succeeded in stamping out corruption. Two new agencies were set up to deal with the problem and already a few cases have been taken to court. The first high-ranking official to be charged in court was Abdullah Puteh, the governor of Aceh. SBY also took steps to clean his own stable, the office of the state secretary, as well as several departments. A big campaign is also underway to weed out dishonest practices within the National Election Commission, concerning deals for polling cards. Eradicating corruption in Indonesia is a tall order as it goes from top to bottom. It takes crude forms like under-the-counter briberies as well as more sophisticated forms like tampering with budgets, siphoning off money from state corporations, stage-managing public tenders, behind-the-scene deals regarding the appointment of top bureaucrats and so on. It is still too early to make an assessment. Perhaps halfway through SBY's term in office, it will be possible to say whether the President has managed to cut back corruption. No miracles in politics and economics Economically, Indonesia is trapped between several blocs. While geographically speaking, it belongs to the emerging East Asia bloc, which includes China and India, SBY realises that too close an association with this bloc could jeopardise ties with the US and Australia. It is no accident that SBY made his first foreign visits to the US and Australia with visits to China and India coming later. In the seventies, Indonesia was in a much stronger geopolitical position. As a major oil and gas producer and a key member of OPEC, Indonesia wielded a strong bargaining position internationally. A special donor conference called IGGI, later renamed CGI, was set up to handle Indonesia's financial and economic needs, with the World Bank in the driving seat. But the World Bank's programmes along with the policies imposed by the IMF weren't particularly successful and the fundamental economic problems have remained unresolved. Nowadays, Indonesia is a net oil importer and its position as producer of cheap commodities has been eroded. In July, the government unveiled an ambitious industrial policy that outlines the development and growth of the country's manufacturing industry over the next 20 years. Ministers are aware that time is running out and the blueprint should have been designed 10 years ago when the manufacturing industries started shifting elsewhere. The biggest challenge will be cost competitiveness and creating a conducive environment, which allows businesses to thrive. The bottom line is the eradication of corruption which means that drastic reforms are needed within the state bureaucracy, the police and military apparatus, all of which are notorious for milking manufacturing industries. Human resources must also be improved. A well-educated workforce which is skilled and highly productive, is the pre-requisite for developing new and competitive companies. Accounting for past human rights abuses Human rights campaigners continue to demand accountability for deeds perpetrated in the past and not so distant past. This is proving to be an uphill struggle but investigations have been resumed on the kidnapping and torture of pro-democracy activists in 1998 and the killing of four students at Trisakti University in May 1998 as well as the shooting of nine demonstrators in Jakarta later that year. Little or no progress has been made in revealing what really happened during the riots and mayhem in 1998 that resulted in hundreds of people being killed and many women being raped and molested, which ultimately led to the downfall of the Suharto regime. The lack of cooperation on the part of the military is blatant, but members of the legislature have also shown an unwillingness to work with Komnas HAM, the National Commission for Human Rights. This Commission prepared a 1,500-page report on the 1998 riots which was submitted to the Attorney General's Office in September 2003. It was returned six months later for failing to include testimony from key people, including officers with responsibility for the abuses from the military and the police. Some of the most senior officers with responsibility for the riots, amongst them; General Wiranto who was at the time armed forces commander-in-chief, Lt-General Prabowo, commander of Kostrad, the Strategic Reserve Troops and Lt-General Syafrie Syamsuddin, the Jakarta military commander all refused to give a testimony or even answer questions. Even if he were of a mind to do so, SBY, a general himself and from the same generation as the above, lacks the bargaining power to force them to cooperation. The military as an institution has functioned as a state within the state since the birth of the Republic. It takes more than gentle persuasion for the officers to accept civilian rule. The peace talks on Aceh and the trauma of East
Timor The SBY government is convinced that a negotiated settlement on Aceh is the only way forward, to move towards a lasting peace. The Helsinki talks (see separate article) prove more than anything else that the military solution failed woefully and only created hardship and devastation for the Acehnese. The determination to make a success of the Helsinki talks has upset many politicians. Many of them harbour the fear that internationalisation will result in Aceh going the same way as East Timor. As a result, there is strong resistance to the peace talks from the nationalist bloc in parliament. Summing up the first six months On the human rights front, not much has been achieved. The historic burden of impunity for the perpetrators has not been dealt with by this government. It will take determination and a huge amount of good will to end impunity. But it can at least be argued that SBY is moving in the right direction.
A UN Commission of Experts has advised the UN Security Council to establish an international criminal tribunal if Indonesia fails to take action towards securing accountability for serious crimes committed in East Timor within six months. Rights groups, including TAPOL, have welcomed the recommendation with reservations about giving Indonesia yet another chance to deliver justice. The Commission of Experts has produced a detailed and thorough report, which is particularly harsh in its criticism of the proceedings of Jakarta's ad hoc human rights court and expresses reservations about the Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) set up by the governments of Indonesia and East Timor. It is the second time a UN-established commission has proposed an international tribunal for East Timor. The previous recommendation was made by the International Commission of Inquiry for East Timor in January 2000. Support for an international tribunal also came from three UN special rapporteurs who reported in December 1999. The Commission of Experts was appointed in February 2005 and tasked by UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, with assessing the ad hoc process in Jakarta and the serious crimes process involving the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) and the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Dili. It was required to recommend further measures so that the perpetrators are held accountable, justice is secured for the victims and the people of East Timor, and reconciliation is promoted. The members of the Commission were Justice Prafullachandra Bhagwati, a former chief justice of India, Professor Yozo Yokota of Japan, a former UN special rapporteur on Burma, and Ms Shaista Shameem, director of the Fiji human rights commission. Jakarta trials 'manifestly inadequate' The prosecuting authorities come in for particular criticism. They are described as lacking commitment, expertise, experience and training and are accused of conducting 'deficient investigations' and of 'inadequate presentation of inculpatory material at trial'. The Commission, while commending the serious crimes process in East Timor, says that it has 'not yet achieved full accountability of those who bear the greatest responsibility', namely high-level indictees outside the jurisdiction. This is attributed to a number of factors, including a lack of resources, a lack of Indonesian cooperation and the General Prosecutor's lack of independence from the government of East Timor. The Commission points out that whereas 391 persons were indicted, charges are still pending against 339 accused who remain at large outside the jurisdiction. CTF perpetuates impunity Many observers are convinced that the CTF will not reveal the truth about the Indonesian army's orchestrated destruction of East Timor nor will it contribute to the sustainable friendship between the peoples of Indonesia and East Timor [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 178, p. 17]. A member of an Indonesia-based NGO is quoted by the Commission as saying 'There are no problems at all between Indonesians and East Timorese, so a reconciliation between peoples of the two countries is not needed. The problem of human rights violations in East Timor does not lie in people-to-people relations, but lies instead with the TNI and its militias as the alleged perpetrators of the violence against the East Timorese'. Recommendations It goes on to recommend a review and possible re-opening of all the ad hoc cases and action by the Attorney General in the case of Gen (ret.) Wiranto, who was the Indonesian armed forces commander-in-chief at the time, and seven other key Indonesian officials. Indonesia should, it says, implement all the recommendations within six months from a date to be fixed by the UN Secretary-General. In the event of Indonesia's failure to comply, the Commission proposes that the Security Council sets up an ad hoc international criminal tribunal through its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Alternatively, it should use the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a vehicle for investigations and prosecutions. TAPOL doubts the value of giving Indonesia another six months to deliver justice. Experience and the findings of the Commission itself have shown that Indonesia is politically unwilling to establish the truth of what happened in East Timor and to hold the perpetrators to account for their crimes. The establishment of the CTF is just the latest manifestation of this lack of political will. The Commission's own recommendation for the strengthening of the judiciary and prosecution indicates that Indonesia currently does not have the capacity to launch fresh proceedings against the leading suspects. In regard to the serious crimes process in East Timor, the Commission advises the Security Council to ensure the continuity of the work until the investigations, indictments, and prosecutions of those alleged to have committed serious crimes are completed. NGOs demand decisive action TAPOL and other international NGOs, including the East Timor Association for Law, Human Rights and Justice, Judicial System Monitoring Programme (East Timor), Human Rights Working Group (Indonesia), Human Rights Watch, International Center for Transitional Justice, International Federation for East Timor, and Watch Indonesia! have written to the UN Secretary General encouraging him to support the Commission's recommendations and advocating decisive action by the international community.[http://tapol.gn.apc.org/news/files/let050712.htm] The organisations have said that a credible system must be established to monitor Indonesia's compliance in the six-month timeframe proposed by the Commission. Given the weaknesses identified by the Commission, such monitoring should include clear standards regarding the drafting of indictments, the conduct of the prosecution, witness protection, and judicial training and independence. It should also provide for steps towards the establishment of an international tribunal in the absence of substantive progress. Pre-1999 crimes must also be addressed Ups and downs in the Helsinki Talks By the end of May 2005, the talks between the Indonesian Government (GOI) and GAM (Free Aceh Movement) seemed to have achieved far-reaching results. After only four meetings since January, Indonesian officials claimed that the two sides had reached agreement on eighty per cent of the issues. It was even hinted that some time between 12 July and early August, a preliminary cease-fire could be signed. As it turns out, the developments were more complex than portrayed by the press. The Helsinki talks, as the talks between the GOI and GAM are known, have indeed proceeded quite smoothly so far. The professionalism marking the way the talks have been handled by CMI, the Crisis Management Institute based in Helsinki, is certainly a major reason for the relatively smooth progress made so far. The other reason was clearly the 'tsunami factor'. The devastation that struck the Acehnese deeply touched the hearts of people in all corners of the world. Emergency and reconstruction became the buzzwords for Aceh, which was hardest hit by the disaster. But at the same time people also realised that Aceh was a region of conflict. This means that starting reconstruction work in Aceh also means resolving the conflict. Former President Bill Clinton gave expression to the logic of this when he arrived in Aceh in the third week of May as special envoy of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The peace efforts were clearly much more upbeat. Both sides showed tremendous political good will to pave the way for a negotiated settlement. GAM in particular made a fundamental compromise by entering the Helsinki talks, accepting them as being within the framework of the Indonesian Republic. Positive developments On 18 May the Indonesian Government announced the abolition of martial law. In May 2003, the province of Aceh had been placed under martial law. For the first year, it was called a state of military emergency while in he second year, it was under a state of civilian emergency. The lifting of martial law was a step towards normalising conditions in Aceh. It was also an important boost for the ongoing peace process in Aceh. Fourth round Helsinki Talks In the fourth round, the substantial issue of security arrangements, a pre-condition for a future cease fire, was on the agenda. As with the previous rounds, the impression portrayed to the outside world was that the talks had been proceeding in a positive and constructive atmosphere. But as it turned out, both sides were digging their feet deeper in the sand. Self-government for Aceh It was clear that the two Jakarta ministers involved in the talks, Hamid Awaluddin and Sofyan Djalil, were given some room to manoeuver in the talks but it appeared as if the boundaries had already been set by statements emanating from government circles in Jakarta that everything would all be within the fold of the Indonesian Constitution. This led to heated debates in the Indonesian Parliament about what this actually means. For some Indonesian legislators, the Indonesian Constitution is something fixed amd immutable while others others see it as a document that can be changed or amended as necessary. For GAM, the boundaries of the Helsinki talks were much more limited. While they had dropped their demand for independence, they were calling instead for far-reaching self-government where the Acehnese would be able to run their own affairs, despite remaining part of the Indonesian Republic. The status of Hong Kong and Bougainville were mentioned as examples of how the GAM leadership envisaged what they meant by the Acehnese running their own affairs. Discussions in the second and third rounds encompassed a number of issues: the sharing of the economic wealth of Aceh, the possibility of having Acehnese parties participating in elections and finding an acceptable format for Aceh within the context of the Indonesian Republic. Although the discussions proved to be quite difficult for both sides, the talks took place in what was described as an amicable atmosphere. It should be explained that, in the post-Suharto era, a new form of decentralisation was adopted for the world's largest archipelago. Within this framework, the conflict areas, Aceh and West Papua, were both granted 'special autonomy'. However, GAM rejected special autonomy, known as NAD (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam), favouring a form of self government under which most political and economic decisions would be in the hands of the Acehnese. By the end of the fourth round, the positions of the two sides had hardened. Jakarta seems to be unwilling to give more than NAD autonomy and stuck rigidly to this position while GAM, encouraged by the openings which had emerged in the previous rounds, insisted that suggestions in the direction of a kind of self-government should be upheld. Belligerent voices in parliament Furthermore, there is substantial hostility towards the peace process within the ranks of the military and widespread misunderstanding and lack of information among members of the Indonesian Parliament in Jakarta, while the peace process was hardly an issue for the general public in Jakarta. The fiercest criticism has come from members from the overwhelmingly Java-based parties, the PDI-P and PKB. In their view, negotiating with rebels is seen as an act of humiliation while what is needed is firm military action. And anyway, if it was necessary to negotiate, the talks should take place in Jakarta. The majority of Indonesian politicians regard Aceh as a domestic issue and regard any 'internationalisation' as being very dangerous. The East Timor case is often taken as example; once that issue had become international, it led ultimately to East Timor becoming independent. Informal talks But it has also become clear that important sections of the military are not happy with the talks. In the first two Helsinki meetings, Major-General Syarifuddin Tippe was a member of the Indonesian delegation. He is still on active service and has held several key positions in the territorial structure of the Aceh military command. He had apparently come to the conclusion that a military solution for Aceh would be destructive and proposed a kind of hearts and minds policy. It is likely that this was why Tippe was chosen to attend the talks. But in the April and May sessions he was conspicuous by his absence. It was put around that he did not represent the views of TNI officers and had therefore been withdrawn by the TNI leadership. The two key persons in TNI have not made many comments so far. TNI Commander-in-chief General Endriartono Sutarto has made some contradictory remarks on the negotiations but so far his remarks have not been destructive for the Helsinki talks. Similarly General Djoko Santoso, the present army chief-of-staff who has a track record of loyalty towards President SBY has avoided making controversial statements. But on the ground things have not changed very much. While the talks proceed, clashes between the TNI and GAM continue without let-up. Official figures published by the military point to a rise in the number skirmishes as well as the number of casualties. As usual, the TNI claims that the casualties are GAM combatants while GAM insists that the victims are predominantly Acehnese civilians. This strange construction of informal talks has placed a heavy political burden on the shoulders of Jusuf Kalla. Criticism from Parliament and other government bodies are being directed at him and so far he has defended the talks quite effectively. He has appeared several times before the First Commission of Parliament to counter the many accusations and answer the many questions being raised. A cease fire agreement in August? One of the fundamental flaws so far is the absence of the voice of representatives of Acehnese civil society in the Helsinki talks. There is an urgency to broaden and deepen the peace process to include members of civil society organisations based in Aceh as well as civil society organisations in Jakarta and other places in Indonesia. As said above, the post tsunami situation has created more favourable conditions for open, substantive discussions on how to end the conflict in Aceh and therefore directly or indirectly contribute positively to the process in Helsinki. Reconstruction in Aceh beset by problems The pace of the reconstruction process in Aceh, six months after the tsunami in December, is going far too slowly. Any assertions to the contrary were dismissed when two of the most prominent men answerable for the work, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, head of Indonesia's special agency for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the province (BRR), and Bill Clinton, UN special envoy for the tsunami, admitted recently that little progress has taken place to date. So why is the pace of progress so slow? Multiple problems are having an impact on reconstruction work in post-tsunami Aceh. The slow pace of reconstruction has been attributed to a number of factors. There is the problem of the infrastructure which, even before the disaster, was severely damaged by thirty years of conflict. Added to this is the sheer scale of a disaster that left over half a million people in need of housing, food, healthcare, educational facilities and cross sectoral support, all of which was compounded by another quake in March that left another 200,000 people dependent on external support. On top of all this, there is the chaotic interplay resulting from multiple, diverse actors flooding the province to try and meet all these needs. The major actors in the reconstruction of Aceh are the Indonesian government, local as well as national, international agencies and NGOs, local NGOs and the local population. All have to face complex daily and interacting realities. The government's capacity is doubly weak as a result of decades of conflict as well as the devastation suffered by the infrastructure from the disaster. At all levels, the political, social, cultural and economic infrastructure is weak because of the ongoing conflict. The large number of groups involved in reconstruction and rehabilitation means that co-ordination is a huge challenge that many have not been able to meet. Local humanitarian and rights activists confront limitations on their space and movement, while the people of Aceh have little information about the humanitarian and development plans that have been devised for their benefit by all these outsiders. Local government After over thirty years of conflict, the central and local government has very fragile relations with the population, not least because of the central government's approach to Aceh. The impact of the conflict on local government further impedes their work. Rufriadi, a local activist, said that the top-down approach of Jakarta has made government officials passive and lacking in initiative. Hitherto, they have been used to receiving and implementing instructions so when the disaster struck, they lacked experience or understanding of how to run local government effectively. Moreover, the military has, in effect, been running the province since the imposition of martial law in May 2003. And yet government, in particular local government, is badly needed by the people and by those who are working to build a better future in post-tsunami Aceh. Corruption widespread These problems have, to some extent, been acknowledged by the central government. The decision to establish a special implementing agency called BRR with overarching powers for the reconstruction was one such admission. The appointment of Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, a man with a reputation as a reputable, 'clean' bureaucrat, to head the BRR, was a constructive attempt to limit the scope for the 'usual' problems. The most significant departure from the usual way of doing things was the decision to allow him to report directly to the President, thus cutting out the overly bureaucratic approach to decision-making that characterises Indonesia. According to Saiful Mahdi, chair of the Aceh Institute, this lack of bureaucratic red tape is a critical step towards solving the problems afflicting Aceh. However, this is not to say there are no challenges ahead. After all, the infrastructure has suffered a double assault, destruction by nature, as well as destruction caused by the conflict. Corruption is certain to be one of the biggest challenges, because so much money is pouring into Aceh thanks to the international response to calls for financial assistance. One NGO, SAMAK. claims that some £15 million has already gone missing. The money cannot be accounted for in the government's figures. SAMAK has accused local government officials of busying themselves in a power struggle rather than seriously working to rebuild Aceh. Moreover, the creation of a new government agency, with yet another line of accountability could itself create new problems, given the already complex and often overlapping power structures in Aceh. The BRR may be the lead agency running reconstruction in the province for the next five years but local government will have to follow their lead for clean and decisive government to have an impact. International role While the international community has made an invaluable contribution, the principle challenge they face is how to improve their work with better co-ordination. Until now, co-ordination between the stakeholder groups has been poor; in some places, several groups have turned up to work in the same village. Some international programmes have been accused of undermining local culture. Cash-for-work programmes, for example, have provided Acehnese with paid work, doing tasks such as cleaning streets and removing rubble, may be doing more harm than good. While in principle it is good to offer Acehnese the chance to earn money, Aceh has a culture of gotong royong (the principle of mutual assistance). Juanda, chair of People's Crisis Centre in Aceh, said that international NGOs need to consider whether the work programmes offered are simply a job or really based on the gotong royong principle. Another area in which local needs are not being sufficiently considered is shelter. There are many reports of barracks built by the government or international NGOs while the Acehnese who will have to live in them have not been consulted. Ongoing conflict Local NGOs and the local population Questions of space and security continue to dog Acehnese groups. It is not true that Aceh is now completely open and any humanitarian work can proceed without hindrance. Locations where organisations can work are limited to Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar. Places elsewhere are difficult to visit, not only logistically but also for security and administrative reasons. Where international groups might have better protection than locals due to the privileges of their position as foreign nationals in Aceh, local groups remain incredibly vulnerable. The other major problem for local groups is their limited capacity, which means that they are in need of strong support in some areas. This has been further exacerbated by the fact that some of the best Acehnese activists have shifted their activities to aid agencies. There are numerous reports of Acehnese activists leaving their organisations in pursuit of higher wages, job security and better records for their CVs by working with international agencies. But these are not the only problems. Perhaps the most difficult issue is that many tsunami survivors and Internally-Displaced People have inadequate information about programmes or policies affecting them in their area or how to access decision-making channels. Information that would allow people to make informed decisions about plans impacting on their lives and their future are simply not available. The Acehnese might very well agree with very controversial decisions taken by the government if the information helping them take that decision were made available to them. Language problem Solidarity for West Papua reverberates in Asia For the first time in the six-year history of the International Solidarity Movement for West Papua, solidarity organisations from around the world met in an Asian country. This meant that groups from South East Asia were much better represented than in the past. The meeting was held at the University of the Philippines, Manila and organised by IID, Initiatives for International Dialogue. The choice of an Asian venue appears to have been seen as more threatening by the Indonesian authorities. Past meetings in Europe and in New Zealand went ahead without any attempts from Jakarta to have them stopped. Not so this time around. Two days before the meeting, the Philippines Foreign Ministry was urged to ban it. A letter from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry asserted that convening such an event was in contravention of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation between ASEAN member states because it violated the integrity of another member state. According to Marty Natalegawa, spokesman of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry: 'We cannot accept the convening of the conference which is seen as violating the integrity of the Indonesian Government, especially as it is being co-organised by a state-sponsored higher education institution.' Similar complaints were made to the Board of the University of the Philippines
in a letter from the Rector of the University of Indonesia and to the
Speaker of the Philippines Parliament in a letter from the Indonesian
Parliament. Jakarta's efforts were to no avail and the meeting went ahead as planned. Altogether thirteen countries were represented: Burma, East Timor, Indonesia (including Aceh), South Korea, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, the Philippines (including Mindanao), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the US, and from Europe, the UK and Ireland. However, a couple of groups who had the backing of the Indonesian authorities sought to intervene by demanding to attend a meeting that was by invitation only. One group which loitered in the lobby of the hotel on the first day, tried to obtain a list of the participants. Some of the participants remembered only too well how a solidarity meeting for East Timor held in Kuala Lumpur back in the 1990s was disrupted by Indonesians. This was during the days of the Suharto era, but the change in regime in Jakarta has not diminished Indonesian sensitivities about solidarity meetings being held so close to home. Papuans face a bleak future Mortality rates among women and children have soared alarmingly in recent years, she said. A survey conducted by the Health Service for 2000 - 2001 showed that out of 100,000 births, 1,601 women died. The death rate for women in childbirth was particularly high in Timika, Biak Numor, Nabire and Yapen Waropen. Factors that contributed to this high mortality rate were malnutrition, the lack of health facilities, insufficient awareness of the signs of labour so that women in labour reached hospitals too late, lack of blood and a very low level of health awareness. The mal-functioning of the legal system meant that women were not getting justice. Although legal instruments were in place to protect the rights of every citizen, women frequently lost out. Recently, a woman who was being held in police custody on a charge of robbery died as a result of serious maltreatment while under interrogation. The police officer responsible was subject to disciplinary measures under the code of ethics. Promotion was suspended for a year and a civilian court sentenced him to four months imprisonment. He was ordered to pay a fine following an agreement reached with the family; this is what accounted for the lenient punishment. Yet, this was a grave criminal act, said Dominggas, which should have been punished according to the law, without family accords being taken into account. Violence against women When the violence is perpetrated by a civil servant or an ordinary citizen, it is easier to obtain a decision for the perpetrator to pay damages but when military personnel are involved, which is often the case in the more remote areas, little can be done since local NGOs are too scared to handle the case. According to data from Abepura Hospital, there were 400 cases of violence
against women in 2000. Figures available from the police in Jayapura for
1999 and 2000 included twenty deaths, 57 cases of torture and 24 cases
of beating. Dominggas also spoke about the prevalence of HIV/Aids in West Papua, where it is spreading much faster than in other parts of Indonesia. The presentation by Dominggas was full of foreboding for the future of the Papuan people. She said she feared that by the time the Papuan people won their independence, hardly any Papuans would be left to enjoy it. Patriarchal culture By and large, the laws and regulations in force fail to provide women with a sense of justice. While agreeing that some recent measures taken by the government were an improvement, she said it was still to early to know how they would turn out in practice. Indonesia's fears of another East Timor The Indonesian government was determined not to repeat the mistakes that resulted in a referendum for the East Timorese and independence, said Naipospos. The government is strongly opposed to Aceh or West Papua seceding and will do everything possible to prevent this. It is trying to play on sentiments within Indonesian society, such as nationalism or Muslim beliefs. It is widely believed that East Timor had been lost as the result of an international conspiracy and now Aceh and West Papua had become the targets of similar plots. The attempts made by Jakarta to ban this meeting were a manifestation of this attitude. He said that the danger of West Papua seceding was seen in Jakarta as being even greater than Aceh, because of the international support that has built up for Papua. Moreover, West Papua's fabulous natural resources were a major reason for Jakarta never to relinquish its control. Indonesia's strategy is now directed towards splitting West Papua into three provinces. One of the new provinces has already been created. According to Naipospos, this will be completed within six months and the civilian administrations will be paralleled by military commands at the provincial, resort, district and sub-district levels. Demographic change was also being promoted, with a constant influx of migrants from Indonesia. Already more than sixty per cent of the population of Jayapura are migrants with Papuans playing a subordinate role in the economy. New KOSTRAD division Naipospos also drew attention to the growing interest in West Papua among Indonesian NGOs such as the PBHI and the Human Rights Working Group. He commended the Franciscans for devoting their presentation at the recent session of the UN Human Rights Commission to West Papua. Human rights situation With tight control over access to West Papua, it is difficult for the national and international media to report on conditions there and even church leaders are facing difficulties accessing areas of conflict. The authorities in Jakarta hold stubbornly to the principle of NKRI (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia), and show no sign of responding to calls from the Papuan people for dialogue. When Papuans organise peaceful demonstrations on 1 December each year by raising their own Kejora (Morning Star) flag, the clampdown is always life-threatening and harsh. Two men are facing lengthy prison sentences having been found guilty of sedition. (See separate article) A series of bloody incidents in Wamena in 2000 following police attacks on Papuan flag posts resulted in the deaths of a number of non-Papuans and many arrests. When a group of local leaders, who were members of the Wamena Panel of the Papuan Presidium Council, took steps to calm people down, they were arrested and later sentenced to four years imprisonment. Encroachments on tribal lands for road building without proper consultation are frequent. The most recent incident, in Puncak Jaya, in the Central Highlands, resulted in military operations which forced thousands of villagers to abandon their homes and gardens, in fear of their lives. Dozens of people have since died from lack of food or inadequate shelter. Military units guarding the Freeport copper-and-gold mine have been frequently responsible for abuses against local people. The British company, BP, which is now undertaking a large-scale investment in liquefied natural gas extraction in Bintuni Bay, known as the Tangguh Project, has announced that it will not agree to any military presence in the vicinity of its investment. However, it is more than likely that the military will provoke incidents in the area, in order to persuade the company to change its mind. The company has refused to acknowledge that it will be operating in an area where human rights violations are routine. Access to West Papua a priority The statement called for the release of all West Papuan political prisoners wherever they are being held, in West Papua or in Indonesia. It also expressed the need for stronger support for West Papuan women's groups and for the implementation of national and international laws to protect West Papuan women against all forms of violence in the home and from the State. The delegates strongly condemned the decision taken by the Indonesian authorities to increase the number of Indonesian troops in West Papua, in particular the deployment of KOSTRAD (Strategic Reserve Force) troops there, which will bring the total number of troops in West Papua to 50,000. They expressed warm support for calls by the West Papuan people for their homeland to become a Land of Peace, in face of a decision by the Indonesian authorities for the militarisation of West Papua. Heavy sentences for flying a flag 1 December is celebrated as West Papua's national day and is the occasion for peaceful demonstrations in support of the demand for self-determination. Although an earlier president, Abdurrahman Wahid, showed sympathy for such actions, they are now treated with a heavy hand by the present administration. It was on 1 December 1961 that the first Papuan People's Congress adopted West Papua as the name of the country, Papua as the name of the name of the nation and people, the Morning Star (Bintang Kejora) as the flag, and the song, Hai Tanahmu, Papua, as the national anthem. After the downfall of Suharto in May 1998, it was possible, for a limited period, for West Papuans to use the greater democratic space to vent to their aspirations. However, that was not the case by 2004. Several dozen West Papuans gathered at Cenderawasih University in Abepura, on the outskirts of the capital, Jayapura, to discuss plans to hold a demonstration on 1 December in support of self-determination. A group then gathered at Trikora field in Abepura on 1 December and unfurled the Kejora flag. They were immediately set upon by police who pulled the flag down and arrested a number of those taking part. While most were released, two men who were deemed to be the ringleaders were detained and have been in custody ever since. On 27 May, the two men, Philep Karma and Yusak Pakage, were convicted and sentenced. Philep was given a 15-year sentence while Yusak was given ten years. The sentences were far heavier than the five years demanded by the prosecution. In announcing his verdict, the presiding judge, Radiantoro, also said that Philep would be stripped of his status as a civil servant, as the court deemed him unfit to work as a state employee. Philep is well known for his openly defiant attitude. When he wears his civil servant's shirt, he always has a Bintang Kelora emblem attached to his lapel. In a statement, TAPOL vehemently condemed the verdicts as being totally unjustified for peaceful actions and called on the Indonesian authorities to release the two men immediately and unconditionally.[see http://tapol.gn.apc.org/news/files/st050531.htm] It further condemned the oppressive use of penal sanctions to suppress the legitimate exercise of the Papuans' rights to freedom of expression and assembly. A popular cause However, following an appearance in court on 10 May, the police refused to allow them to address the crowd. This so infuriated the people that they stood their ground and there were clashes with the police. Dozens of people, including policemen, were injured. The incident was shown on television and widely reported in the local and national press. The police were clearly visible brutally beating up the protesters and committing random acts of violence. These shots, beamed across the country, were a great embarrassment for the government and the chief of police. Such was the outcry that several police officers were immediately dismissed for mis-handling the demonstration. Military build-up threatens Land of Peace campaign The Indonesian military, TNI, has revealed plans to deploy 12,000 to 15,000 more troops in West Papua between 2005 and 2009, bringing the troop presence up to a massive 45,000 to 50,000. This alarming development has grave implications for human rights and efforts to promote West Papua as a Land of Peace. The latest military build-up began on 2 June when West Papua's outgoing military commander, Major-General Nurdin Zainal, inaugurated a new resort or sub-regional military command (Korem 174) at Merauke in the south of the province, near the border with Papua New Guinea. In March, the TNI announced plans to locate a new division of its strategic reserve command, Kostrad, in the province and increase the number of infantry battalions from three to six. The first 5,000 Kostrad troops will be deployed to Sorong in the west of the province, close to the BP Tangguh natural gas project. When launching Korem 174 in Merauke, Zainal stated that the additional
command was urgently needed to optimise the defence of West Papua. He
said that the enhanced military presence would still be too small Spurious justification Even now, the TNI is engaged in a prolonged military offensive in West Papua's Central Highlands, which has displaced thousands and claimed an unknown number of lives through extra-judicial killings and the starvation and exposure of villagers forced to flee their homes. There are also ongoing concerns about the link between the military and Laskar Jihad Islamic militants and local East Timor-style militias. The Indonesian army has a reputation for creating violent incidents in order to provoke unrest, justifying its continued presence in West Papua in the interests of security, and reinforcing its control of the territory. The Papuans have shown remarkable restraint in the face of such provocation, but have suffered grievously. There are already 8,000 non-organic troops deployed to guard the Freeport copper-and-gold mine in Tembagapura. Although BP has said that does not want army troops to provide security at its Tangguh project in Bintuni Bay, close to Sorong, there are concerns that the army will create incidents in the vicinity of the natural gas project to force the company to reverse its decision, or face the consequences. The company may be forced to acquiesce in military intervention if the army creates the perception that it is the only institution capable of delivering security. The planned army build-up in West Papua is in sharp contrast to the calls by Papuans for their homeland to be made a Land of Peace. Such a powerful slogan signifies the degree to which Papuans have felt the oppressive presence of Indonesian troops. The Land of Peace campaign rejects the increasing militarisation of the territory. It also aims to provide space for political dialogue and create conditions in which human rights are fully protected, impunity is ended and proper attention is given to the economic, social and cultural needs of the West Papuan people. Aceh veteran to head military in Papua West Papua now has four sub-regional military commands (Korem) and ten district commands (Kodim) [see above briefing paper]. A planned increase in the number of administrative districts (Kabupaten) - currently 29 - means that the number of Kodim is also likely to increase. A new Kabupaten was established at Bintuni Bay, the location of the BP project, in 2003. Three infantry battalions (usually six to seven hundred men each) are currently based in Jayapura (Battalion 751), Sorong (752), Nabire (753). The three new battalions are planned for Timika (754), Merauke (755), and Wamena (756). A cavalry detachment will be based in Timika. There is also a battalion of Brimob ('Brigade Mobil', police special forces renowned for their brutality) in Jayapura and an air force battalion (Paskasau) in Biak. The Merauke battalion, which is likely to form part of the new Korem, has already attracted controversy. Plans to locate the headquarters of the battalion in the Wasur National Park have prompted NGOs to express concern about its impact on the livelihoods of local indigenous communities. They have already been severely affected by dramatic demographic changes, resulting from official transmigration and spontaneous migration from Indonesia. This has left Papuans in a minority in Merauke and other urban centres [See Down to Earth newsletter 65:17 at http://dte.gn.apc.org/65WAS.HTM; and 'Indigenous People Marginalized at Wasur National Park', Jakarta Post, 19 April 2005]. The new Kostrad division will substantially increase the number of non-organic troops in West Papua. At present, Kostrad has two divisions, both of which are based in Java. The decision to base the new third division in Papua is a sign of the huge importance the TNI attaches to the need to increase its presence in a province so richly endowed with natural resources and a population seething with discontent. Kostrad units are highly specialised troops equipped with the most advanced weaponry available, who undergo especially rigorous training for combat. The decision to locate the new division in Sorong was, according to armed forces commander-in-chief, General Endriartono Sutarto, made to safeguard external borders and maritime zones and to facilitate the TNI's ability to deploy troops at short notice. When asked, why in Sorong, he said: 'To be closer to places which we consider to be in need of strengthening.' Military structure The command structure duplicates the civilian government at every level,
just as it did during the Suharto era. This oppressive presence enables
the military to exert tight control over the population and provides it
with ample opportunities to conduct lucrative business activities, including
those associated with the illegal logging of West Papua's rich and extensive
forests.The competition for business is likely to intensify with the increase
in troop numbers. BP makes security deal with Timor crimes suspect Timbul Silaen was West Papua's chief of police at the time he signed
the agreement in April 2004. He occupied the same position in East Timor
when it was devastated by the Indonesian military and its militia proxies
following the country's historic vote for independence in 1999. He was
implicated in the East Timor violence and indicted by the UN-backed Serious
Crimes Unit and Special Panels for Serious Crimes. A copy of the indictment
is available at: In common with hundreds of other Indonesia-based suspects, he failed to submit to the jurisdiction of the court, which prematurely ceased work in May [see separate item]. The nature of Silaen's alleged crimes - against East Timorese independence supporters - is especially relevant to the context of West Papua, where support for independence is equally strong. The agreement he signed is a Letter of Joint Decree between BP and the
Police in West Papua concerning 'Field guidelines for joint security measures
within the work area of the Tangguh LNG project' The agreement is available
on the BP website at: The stated aim is 'to create and promote common views, conduct and actions
to ensure that all security activities are performed with a high level
of discipline and professionalism and in accordance with applicable law
and human rights'. TAPOL, Down to Earth and the Free West Papua Campaign wrote to BP accusing
it of endorsing impunity in dealing with Silaen, of paying lip service
to the human rights of the Papuans, and of persistently refusing to acknowledge
the wider human rights context, in West Papua and Indonesia, within which
it is operating The text of the letter is available at: In a statement, the three groups expressed disbelief at BP's actions: 'It defies belief that BP saw fi |